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Abstract—Large capacity machine learning models are prone
to membership inference attacks in which an adversary aims
to infer whether a particular data sample is a member of the
target model’s training dataset. Such membership inferences can
lead to serious privacy violations as machine learning models are
often trained using privacy-sensitive data such as medical records
and controversial user opinions. Recently defenses against mem-
bership inference attacks are developed, in particular, based on
differential privacy and adversarial regularization; unfortunately,
such defenses highly impact the classification accuracy of the
underlying machine learning models.
In this work, we present a new defense against membership
inference attacks that preserves the utility of the target ma-
chine learning models significantly better than prior defenses.
Our defense, called distillation for membership privacy (DMP),
leverages knowledge distillation, a model compression technique,
to train machine learning models with membership privacy. We
use different techniques in the DMP to maximize its membership
privacy with minor degradation to utility. DMP works effectively
against the attackers with either a whitebox or blackbox access
to the target model.
We evaluate DMP’s performance through extensive experi-
ments on different deep neural networks and using various
benchmark datasets. We show that DMP provides a significantly
better tradeoff between inference resilience and classification per-
formance than state-of-the-art membership inference defenses.
For instance, a DMP-trained DenseNet provides a classification
accuracy of 65.3% for a 54.4% (54.7%) blackbox (whitebox)
membership inference attack accuracy, while an adversarially
regularized DenseNet provides a classification accuracy of only
53.7% for a (much worse) 68.7% (69.5%) blackbox (whitebox)
membership inference attack accuracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent breakthroughs in deep learning and computing
infrastructure, and the availability of large amounts of data
have facilitated the adoption of machine learning (ML) in
various domains ranging from recommendation systems to
critical health-care management. The quality and quantity
of data plays an instrumental role in the performance of
machine learning models. Many companies providing ML-
as-a-Service computing platforms (e.g., Google API, Amazon
AWS, etc.) enable novice data owners to train ML models for
different applications. Such models are then released either as
a prediction API and accessed in a blackbox fashion, or as a
set of parameters and accessed in a whitebox fashion.
The data used for training ML models often contains sensi-
tive user information such as clinical records, location traces,
personal photos, etc. [8], [9], [42]; therefore, an ML model
trained using sensitive data may pose privacy threats to the
data owners by leaking the sensitive training information. This
has been demonstrated through various inference attacks [19],
[39], [13], [18], [6], [27], most notably the membership
inference attack [40] which is the focus of our work. An
adversary with just a blackbox access to the target model can
mount successful membership inference attack to determine
if a given target sample belonged to the training set of the
target model or not [30]. The attack performance significantly
improves with a whitebox access to the trained models [31].
Membership inference attacks are able to distinguish the
members from non-members by learning the behavior of the
target model on member versus non-member inputs. They use
different features of the target model for this classification,
including the entropy of the predictions [40], the input loss,
and gradients of the input loss with respect to the model
parameters [31]. Membership inference attacks are particularly
more impactful against large neural networks [40], [28], [13],
[14], [38] because such models can better memorize their
training samples.
Recent work has investigated several defenses against mem-
bership inference attacks. Early defenses suggest to limit
information disclosure by releasing only a subset of the
predictions [40], [13]. Such defenses, however, are shown to be
ineffective against membership inference attacks [40] and can
not be deployed in the whitebox setting. Another major class
of defense mechanisms adds noise to gradients or outputs of
the model to provide differential privacy (DP) guarantees [33],
[3], [5], [7], [35]. These defenses aim to protect privacy
of any training dataset (but not the specific training dataset
used to train a given model). Therefore, they add very large
amount of noise which significantly hurts the utility of the
trained models [35], [33]. Finally, recent work [30] suggests
to use adversarial regularization defense targeted to defeat
membership leakage by improving the target model’s general-
ization. Such defenses also suffer from a significant utility loss,
and, as we empirically show, cannot provide acceptable trade-
offs between membership privacy and utility when evaluated
against whitebox or blackbox membership inference attacks
[31]. In summary, the existing defenses against membership
inference attacks offer poor tradeoffs between model utility
and membership privacy.
Our contributions. In this work, we demonstrate a de-
fense against membership inference attacks that provides
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a significantly better tradeoff between privacy and utility
compared to the existing defenses. That is, our defense can
reduce membership leakage with very little degradation to the
classification performance of the target model. Also, unlike
some of the previous defenses, our defense works against
both blackbox and whitebox adversaries. We call our defense
mechanism distillation for membership privacy (DMP), as it
uses knowledge distillation [2], [16]. Knowledge distillation
(also known as knowledge transfer) is a training paradigm used
to reduce the sizes of trained models, therefore enabling their
deployment on resource-constrained devices such as mobile
phones.
The objective of our defense, DMP, is to train a machine
learning model resilient to membership inference attacks with
either a blackbox or whitebox access to the model. The first
stage of DMP is the pre-disillation phase in which DMP learns
an unprotected model by training on the sensitive (private)
training data without any privacy mechanism. Next, during
the distillation phase, DMP distills (transfers) the knowledge
of the unprotected model using a non-private reference data
drawn from the same distribution as the sensitive dataset. The
final stage of DMP is the post-distillation phase in which DMP
trains a protected model on the reference data and its distilled
labels. Such protected model is the output of DMP. Note that,
unlike conventional uses of knowledge distillation, DMP does
not use distillation for model compression; therefore the size
of the protected is the same as that of the unprotected model.
We define a membership leakage metric to quantify mem-
bership leakage through a trained model’s predictions. Our
metric measures the membership leakage about a data sample
as the difference in the entropy of predictions of models trained
with and without the data sample in their training data. As
mentioned above, our DMP defense transfers the knowledge
of a (privacy-leaking) trained model using a (non-sensitive)
reference dataset which is drawn from the same distribution
as the sensitive training dataset. We use our leakage metric to
select the (non-sensitive) reference data used by DMP such
that it reduces membership leakage. Additionally, DMP uses
a softmax layer at an appropriate temperature to make the
distribution of prediction vectors close to uniform distribution,
and therefore increasing its entropy. We show that increasing
the softmax temperature reduces the difference in the entropies
of predictions of the models trained with and without the
target data sample, and reduces membership leakage about
the sample.
DMP’s objective is to preserve the utility of the target model
while reducing membership leakage. To do so, DMP trains the
protected (i.e., membership-inference resistant) model using
Kullback-Leibler divergence as the loss function. This forces
the protected model to imitate the behavior of the original,
unprotected model on the reference data, therefore, strongly
preserves classification accuracy of the model[45], [2], [16].
We show that the use of the softmax layer at high temperatures
in the protected model reduces the generalization error of the
unprotected model and strengthens its membership privacy.
Essentially, DMP leverages the noise due to the uncertainty
in predictions of the unprotected model, and provides highly
generalized models resistant to inference attacks.
We evaluate DMP extensively on several benchmark classi-
fication tasks and show that DMP significantly outperforms
existing defenses in terms of the trade-offs between util-
ity and privacy. For example, for CIFAR-100 classification
with DenseNet (L=100,k=12), training, test, and inference
accuracies of the DMP-trained model are 66.7%, 63.1%, and
53%, respectively, which are significantly better than the
adversarially regularized model (77.8%, 58.4%, and 61.9%,
respectively) and the unprotected model (99%, 65.2%, and,
72.2%, respectively), in terms of privacy-utility tradeoffs. For
a deeper DenseNet (L=140,k=19), to reduce the generalization
error by 26% over the unprotected model, DMP incurs 0.2%
accuracy loss while an adversarially regularized model incurs
a 27% accuracy loss. Evaluating any defense mechanism on
small datasets is important, because memorization becomes
significant for smaller datasets [6], [27]; our evaluation shows
the efficacy of DMP in this setting. Furthermore, the reg-
ularization performance of DMP is far more superior than
adversarial regularization: DMP reduces generalization er-
ror by half for Purchase-100 while for CIFAR-100 the
reduction is 10-folds. Membership inference attacks exploit
statistical differences between various features of given model
on members and non-members of its training dataset; we
empirically show the indistinguishability of such features due
to DMP training which strengthens membership inference
resistance of the model.
Throughout our experiments, we use non-sensitive reference
data which has only feature vectors without true labels.
However, in the presence of true labels, DMP-trained
models outperform the baseline unprotected models (by
3% for Purchase-100 and CIFAR-100 tasks) in terms of clas-
sification accuracy, while preserving the membership privacy
of the private training data. Note that, we do not claim
an information-theoretic privacy using DMP, as promised by
differential privacy [10] techniques, instead we demonstrate
DMP’s empirical privacy against membership inference attacks
for given training datasets.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe some preliminary concepts
required to understand the intuition behind our proposed tech-
nique. Specifically, we describe the machine learning setting,
membership inference attacks, and knowledge distillation.
A. Machine learning setting
In this work, we focus on supervised learning and classi-
fication problems. Let X be the d-dimensional feature space
and Y be the n-dimensional output space, where n denotes the
total number of prediction classes. The objective of machine
learning is to learn a mapping θ : X → Y that outputs an n-
dimensional vector with each dimension y ∈ Y representing
the probability of input belonging to the corresponding class.
Let Pr(X,Y) be the underlying distribution of all data points
in the universe X × Y , where X and Y are random variables
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for the feature vectors and the classes of data points, respec-
tively. Consider `(θ(x), y) to be a loss function measuring the
deviation of the model’s prediction on input x, and the actual
label of x, i.e., y. The objective a machine learning model is
to minimize the expected loss over all (x, y):
L(θ) = E
(x,y)∼Pr(X,Y)
[`(θ(x), y)]
This minimization is intractable because it is over the entire
data population. Therefore, in practice, the loss functions is
minimized over a finite set of training samples which is drawn
from the population, i.e., Dtr ⊂ (X,Y ). The corresponding
optimization problem is:
LDtr(θ) =
1
|Dtr|
∑
(x,y)∈Dtr
`(θ(x), y) (1)
θ∗ = argmin
θ
LDtr(θ) + λR(θ) (2)
where θ is the model, R(θ) is a regularizer whose goal is to
generalize the model, and λ is a hyperparameter.
B. Knowledge distillation
Knowledge distillation was introduced by Hinton et al.
[16] with the purpose of model compression that allows the
deployment of large models on resource-constrained devices
such as mobile phones. The intuition behind distillation is that,
the knowledge acquired by models is not only encoded in
model parameters but also in model predictions. To perform
distillation, a large network, θ, is trained normally on some
data, D. Then a possibly overlapping data, D′, is drawn from
the same distribution as D, and the prediction vectors (called
soft labels) of D′ are obtained by querying θ. Finally, the
soft labels and features of D′ are used to train another neural
network θ′ with a smaller (compressed) size.
Usually, machine learning models use a softmax layer after
their output layer, to produce probabilities over the classes.
The functionality of the softmax layer is given by
F (X) =
[
ezl(X)/T∑n−1
i=0 e
zi(X)/T
]
l∈0...n−1
(3)
where the z(X) vector denotes the n-dimensional output
of the last layer of neural network, and T is a parameter of
softmax called temperature. To train the distilled network, θ′,
either of z(X) or F (X) can be used.
If the true labels, called hard labels, are available for
features of D′, the dataset is called labeled otherwise called
unlabeled. If D′ is labeled, the distilled network, θ′, can be
trained with both hard and soft labels. As shown in other
domains [34], [45], [2], the accuracy of θ′ is generally very
close to or even better (in case of labeled D′) than that of θ.
We note that in knowledge distillation the size of second neural
network is smaller than that of the network whose knowledge
is distilled in D′, however when these two networks have the
same size the learning process is also known as knowledge
transfer. We use the term ‘knowledge distillation’ in our work,
as it does not affect our analysis or results.
C. Membership inference attack setting
Membership inference is a serious privacy concern for
machine learning models [15], [28], [40], [25]. Consider a
machine learning model θ and a data sample (x, y). The
goal of a membership inference adversary is to infer whether
(x, y) belongs to the dataset used to train the model θ. The
membership inference attack exploits the memorization of
training data by large neural networks by inspecting various
features of the target trained model. Therefore, the standard
approach for the membership inference adversary is to train
an inference model, h, whose goal is to classify data samples
into members and non-members.
Let θ be the target model and h : F(X,Y, θ)→ [0, 1] be the
inference model. For a given data sample (x, y), the inference
adversary evaluates F(X,Y, θ), which is a combination of
different features of θ related to (x, y), for instance, θ’s
prediction on the record [40], [30], [28], the loss function on
the record, the gradients of the loss [31], [28], etc. Based on
this input feature vector F(X,Y, θ), the output of h is the
probability that (x, y) has been a member of θ’s training set.
Let PrD(X,Y) and Pr\D(X,Y) be the conditional probabil-
ities of the members and non-members, respectively. For the
above setting, the expected gain of the inference model can
be computed as:
Gθ(h) = 0.5× E
(x,y)∼PrD(X,Y)
[log(h(F(x, y, θ)))]
+ 0.5× E
(x,y)∼Pr\D(X,Y)
[log(1− h(F(x, y, θ)))] (4)
In practice [15], [28], [40], [25], [31], [30], the inference
adversary only knows a (small) subset of the members D,
i.e., she only knows DA ⊂ D and has access to enough non-
members D′A required to train h. Therefore, the adversary
computes an empirical gain as:
Gθ,DA,D′A(h) =
1
|DA|
∑
(x,y)∈DA
[log(h(F(x, y, θ)))]
+
1
|D′A|
∑
(x,y)∈D′A
[log(1− h(F(x, y, θ)))]
(5)
which is used to get the inference model:
h = argmax
h
Gθ,DA,D′A(h) (6)
In (5), the two summations compute the empirical gain of
inference model on the subset of members and non-members
that the adversary has. The empirical gain decreases if the
features, F(x, y, θ), on the members and non-members are
indistinguishable.
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Figure 1: The three stages of Distillation for Membership Privacy technique.
III. INTRODUCING DISTILLATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
PRIVACY (DMP)
We present Distillation For Membership Privacy (DMP),
whose goal is to train ML models that are resilient to mem-
bership inference attacks. Our design of DMP is motivated
by the poor privacy-utility tradeoffs provided by existing
defenses against membership inference discussed in Section
VII. DMP leverages knowledge distillation [16], introduced
in Section II-B, to train high-utility ML models resistant to
membership inference.
A. Notations
We start by introducing the notations used throughout the
paper. We consider the data universe (X × Y ) where X is
the exhaustive set of feature vectors and Y is the set of class
labels corresponding to each feature vector in X . Pr(X,Y)
represents the underlying distribution of (X × Y ), where X
and Y are random variables representing the feature vectors
and the label vectors, respectively. A labeled dataset consists
of pairs of feature vectors and labels, i.e., it is a subset of
(X × Y ). On the other hand, an unlabeled dataset consists of
only feature vectors, i.e., it is a subset of (X).
We use Dtr ⊂ (X×Y ) to refer to a private training dataset,
i.e., a dataset containing privacy-sensitive information. We call
an ML model trained using a private dataset Dtr as unprotected
model, as such a model is susceptible to membership inference
attacks. We denote such unprotected model by θup. On the
other hand, we call an ML model protected and denote it by
θp if it is trained in a way that resists membership inference
attacks. Recall that the goal of our DMP technique is to create
such protected models.
As described later, DMP creates protected models using
the non-sensitive reference dataset (which is disjoint from the
sensitive training dataset Dtr). Xref represents an unlabeled
reference dataset, and Y ref represents the soft labels (prediction
vectors) of θup on Xref. Unless stated otherwise, we assume
that any model θ uses a softmax layer. We use the notation
θT if softmax temperature is to be specified. For instance, θ4up
is θup augmented with a softmax layer with a temperature of
T = 4.
B. Main intuition of DMP
In this work we focus on large capacity neural networks
which memorize their training data [28], [31], [40], [41] and
perform significantly differently on the members versus non-
members of the training data. This difference facilitates mem-
bership inference attacks, and therefore, should be minimized.
In the pre-distillation phase, we train an unprotected model,
θup, on Dtr without any privacy guarantees. The intuition
behind DMP is that, for the data outside of Dtr, the entropies
of output distribution of θup trained on Dtr with or without
any particular sample are indistinguishable. That is, such
predictions do not provide significant membership information
about the particular sample from Dtr.
To make output distributions of θup even more indistin-
guishable, DMP uses softmax layer in θup at high temperature
to label Xref and smooths distribution of θup(Xref). Finally,
DMP trains a protected model, θp, on these predictions with
reduced membership information. The high prediction entropy
acts as noise during the training of θp and increases resistance
of θp to membership inference. However, due to training
on θup(Xref) using KL-divergence loss, DMP-trained models
perfectly match the performance of θup on the test data, and
therefore, have high classification performance.
C. Details of the DMP technique
Here we present the details of the DMP technique, which
Algorithm. 1 summarizes. DMP has three main phases, as
described below.
1) Pre-distillation phase: In this phase, an unprotected
model θup is trained on the sensitive, labeled training data,
Dtr. Therefore, the unprotected model θup is obtained using
standard training techniques without any privacy enforcement;
in particular, we simply use the stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) algorithm to train θup with optimized loss on Dtr:
θup = argmin
θ
− 1|Dtr|
∑
(x,y)∈(Dtr)
C−1∑
i=0
Ii=y log(θ(x)) (7)
4
Algorithm 1 Distillation for Membership Privacy
1: Input: Dtr, Xref, Tup, Tp
2: Initialize θup . Initialization
3: for Tup epochs do
4: Perform SGD with cross-entropy loss:
5: argmin
θup
− 1|Dtr|
∑
(x,y)∈(Dtr) LCE(θup(x), y)
6: end for . Pre-distillation
7: Y ref = {y = θup(x) ...∀ x ∈ Xref} . Distillation
8: for Tp epochs do
9: Perform SGD to minimize KL divergence loss between
θp(x) and θup(x)
10: argmin
θp
1
|Xref|
∑
x∈Xref LKL(θp(x), θup(x))
11: end for . Post-distillation
12: Output: θp
where Ii=y is an indicator function which outputs 1 when
i is the true class of the sample (x, y) and 0 otherwise; C is
the number of classes in the classification task. Note that we
use a softmax layer (introduced in Section II-B) as the last
layer of our unprotected model. Therefore, θ(x) in (7) is the
class probability vector obtained by passing the logits of the
model’s output through the softmax layer.
2) Distillation phase: In this phase, we first obtain the
reference data, Xref, that is used to transfer the knowledge
of θup in θp. The selection of Xref is important to reduce the
membership leakage; later, we discuss the selection process in
Section IV-A. Note that, the unlabeled Xref alone cannot be
used for learning due to the unavailability of labels. We label
Xref using θup to get Y ref, where Y ref = θup(Xref). Note that
the last layer of θup is a softmax layer at temperature T . As
shown later in Section IV-C, the temperature parameter should
be chosen properly to increase resilience to membership
inference attacks. Also, we will show that the high entropy
(uncertainty) of the predictions, Y ref, of the unprotected model
is the key enabler of membership privacy.
3) Post-distillation phase: In this phase, we train a pro-
tected model θp using the reference data (Xref, Y ref) obtained
in the distillation phase. Since the knowledge of θup is distilled
in the soft labels of Xref, i.e., on (Xref, Y ref), we expect θp
to provide a utility close to its corresponding unprotected
(sensitive) model θup.
The empirical risk for model θp on a sample (x,y) ∈
(Xref , Y ref) is defined using the Kullback-Leibler divergence;
here, y = θup(x). The final θp is obtained by solving
the empirical risk minimization optimization problem given
by (9).
LKL(x,y) =
C−1∑
i=0
θ(x)i log
(θ(x)i
yi
)
(8)
θp = argmin
θ
1
|Xref|
∑
(x,y)∈(Xref ,Y ref)
LKL(x,y) (9)
Note that, (9) is minimized when θup(x) = θp(x) for all
(x,y) ∈ (Xref , Y ref). Hence, θp perfectly learns the behavior
of θup on the non-member inputs. Hence, in theory, the
performance of θp on the test data is similar to that of θup;
this has been empirically observed in many previous works.
However, the low confidence (i.e., high entropy) of θtr in the
Y ref predictions prevents θp from learning the behavior of θup
on the members: the prediction entropy of θp on members
is very high (Figure 2 middle) unlike that of θup (Figure
2 left). θp does not converge to θup, because the latter is
trained explicitly to learn the mapping fup : x → y for
(x, y) ∈ Dtr while the earlier learns the mapping fp : x→ y
for (x,y) ∈ (Xref, Y ref). Due to this empirical risk minimiza-
tion, the DMP-trained models do not loose classification
performance on the test data while preserving membership
privacy; our experiments will confirm this hypothesis.
IV. ANALYSIS OF DISTILLATION FOR MEMBERSHIP
PRIVACY
In this section, we analyze and discuss the sources of
membership resistance provided by DMP. Specifically, we will
show the impact of different components of DMP in reducing
membership leakage, and will discuss some of our design
choices towards better membership defense.
A. Membership leakage metric
We define a membership leakage metric to quantify mem-
bership leakage through a model’s predictions.
Definition 1. (Membership leakage) Consider datasets D ∼
Pr(X,Y) and D′ ← D\(x, y) differing in a single sample
(x, y), and models θ and θ′ trained on D and D′, respectively.
Then, the membership leakage about (x, y) due to any sample
(x′, y′) ∼ Pr(X,Y) is directly proportional to the distance
D between features of θ and θ′ on (x′, y′) extracted using a
function F , i.e.,
Iml(D,x′, y′,x, y) = K.D(F(θ,x′, y′),F(θ′,x′, y′)) (10)
Here, K is a constant of proportionality. Therefore, Iml
measures membership leakage due to features of θ on an input
(x′, y′), for a specific member, (x, y), of a given training set
D. Examples of the features, F , include prediction, prediction
entropy, the input loss and gradients of the loss with respect
to the model parameters [28], [40], [41]. Potential distance
metrics, D, include Lp norm and KL-divergence. In DMP, the
only source of membership leakage to θp is the predictions
of θup on unlabeled reference data, Xref. For concreteness, we
use the L1 norm of the difference between the entropies of
model predictions as the function f , i.e.,
Iml(D,x′,x, y) = K.|H(θ(x′))−H(θ′(x′)| (11)
H(θ(x)) = −
n∑
i=0
θ(x)i log(θ(x)i)
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Figure 2: Dependence of membership leakage on entropy (uncertainty) of predictions. (Left) Per class average entropy
of predictions of θup on feature vectors from Dtr (members), Xref (non-members) and ( 12Dtr +
1
2Xref) (mix). (Middle)
Indistinguishability of entropies of predictions of θp on member and non-members of Dtr makes θp resistant to membership
inference attacks. (Right) Difference between entropies of predictions of three different θp’s learned on predictions of the three
prediction sets reduces with increase in per class average entropy of predictions.
Therefore, this Iml1 captures the effect of training data on
the entropy of model predictions.
B. Reference data selection to reduce membership leakage
In this section, we draw connections between membership
leakage through the predictions of θup and the entropy of these
predictions, and give a practical approach of measuring mem-
bership leakage. We then justify the utility of our approach to
select Xref used to transfer the knowledge of θup.
The intuition behind Iml stems from the significantly dif-
ferent behavior of deep neural networks on members and
non-members of their training data. Therefore, Iml is not
an absolute metric, but a relative measure of the sensitive
membership information content. We explain this statement for
our setting. For any training sample (x, y) ∈ Dtr, the entropy
H(θup(x)) will be low, because (x, y) is memorized by θup.
But, H(θ′up(x)) will be high, because θ
′
up is not trained on
(x, y). Therefore, the predictions of (x, y) using θp trained
on (x, θup(x)) versus (x, θ′up(x)) in the post-distillation phase
will have low and high entropies, respectively. This difference
in entropies will facilitate membership leakage for (x, y)
through θp. This entropy difference primarily arises due to
training θp on the data for which the predictions of θup
have very low entropies. Such low entropy predictions are
characteristic of the data similar to the training data of the
target neural networks, and convey the sensitive membership
information [40], [28], [47], [31].
On the other hand, both H(θup(x′)) and H(θ′up(x
′)) are
high for (x′, y′) /∈ Dtr, because none of the Dtr samples sig-
nificantly influences these predictions. Note that, if H(θup(x′))
is high, H(θ′up(x
′)) will also be high. This is quite intuitive,
because a model cannot learn more by removing samples from
its training dataset, assuming there are no malicious data that
increase the entropy due to their presence in the training data.
Consequently, θp trained on (x′, θup(x′)) versus (x′, θ′up(x
′))
will have high entropy (low confidence) on the (x, y) in both
1When it is clear from the context, we omit (D,x′,x, y) from
Iml(D,x′,x, y).
the cases, which reduces the membership inference risk to
the (x, y). Therefore, high entropy predictions result in lower
membership leakage than low entropy predictions.
Computing Iml is not practical as it requires repetitive
training; therefore, in the rest of the paper, we use the entropy
of predictions to represent membership leakage, since it is
inversely proportional to Iml as discussed above. We validate
this in Figure 2, using AlexNet trained on CIFAR-100 data.
We distill the knowledge of θup using the feature vectors of
Xref,
(
1
2Dtr +
1
2Xref
)
and Dtr. As can be seen, reducing the
proportion of Dtr in the data used for distillation increases
the per class entropy of Y ref (Figure 2 (Left)). Next, we
train three θp on the three different sets of feature vectors
and corresponding predictions. We observe that, when θp
is trained on the predictions with higher entropy, its
predictions on members and non-members of Dtr (Figure
2 (Right)) become more indistinguishable. The difference
is maximum for θp trained on Dtr itself, i.e., when the
entropy of predictions is 0. The difference is minimum for θp
trained on θup(Xref), i.e., on the predictions with maximum
entropy. The indistinguishable entropies of predictions of the
latter θp on members and non-members of Dtr are shown
in Figure 2 (Middle). This indistinguishability mitigates the
membership inference risk. Therefore, for effective reduction
of membership leakage, we select reference data for which
the predictions of θup have high entropy. Note that, the
predictions with high entropy do not leak sensitive membership
information, but the vice versa need not be true.
Finally, note that the larger the size of Xref, the more
the membership leakage via the predictions, Yref [33], [3].
However, increasing the reference data also improves the
classification accuracy of θp. We demonstrate the tradeoff
between classification accuracy and membership inference risk
in Figure 5 of Section VI-B1. Therefore, in DMP, we argue to
select the size of reference based on the desired utility-privacy
tradeoffs.
In summary, we introduce a membership leakage metric to
measure the relative membership information content in the
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predictions of a model. We then introduce a more practical
approach to measure membership leakage based on the metric
and use it to select non-sensitive reference data. We leave
investigating the exact membership leakage metric to future
work, and focus in this work on demonstrating the efficacy of
DMP using randomly sampled Xref from available data.
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Figure 3: Role of softmax T in DMP in reducing the mem-
bership leakage about Dtr. (Top): Shows the difference in
per class average entropies of predictions of θTup on Dtr and
Dref, for T ∈ {1, 1.5, 2}. Increasing the softmax T makes
the predictions of θup more indistinguishable and reduces the
membership leakage about Dtr. (Bottom): Shows this differ-
ence for three different θ1p’s trained on {Xref, θTup(Xref)} T ∈
{1, 1.5, 2}. As the softmax T in θTup increases, the predictions
of corresponding θ1p become more indistinguishable due to
reduced membership leakage through θTup(Xref).
C. The impact of softmax on membership leakage and gener-
alization error
As argued above, DMP can better reduce membership leak-
age by using reference data for which entropy of predictions
of the unprotected model is high. In this section, we discuss
how DMP uses a softmax layer to further increase the entropy
of predictions and reduce membership leakage. At T = ∞,
softmax output is a uniform distribution with entropy of 1.
Note that, entropy is a continuous function and therefore the
difference of entropies is also a continuous function. The
entropies of θup(x′) and θ′up(x
′) tend to 1 with increase in
temperature of softmax in θup and θ′up, respectively. That
is, their difference continuously reduces to 0 from some
finite value. Therefore, increasing the softmax temperature
reduces the difference between the entropies of distributions
θup(x
′) and θ′up(x
′). By definition, this reduction bounds the
membership leakage via θup(x′).
We demonstrate this on a fully connected network trained
on Purchase-100 dataset, in Figure 3. The effect of the
temperature of softmax layer in θup is shown in Figure 3 (Top):
With increase in the softmax temperature, the difference in
the per-class average entropy of predictions of θup on Dtr and
Dref reduces. As discussed above, this reduction is because the
distribution of all of these predictions tends to be uniform. We
then train three different θps on different prediction sets which
are obtained with the softmax temperature in θup set at 1, 1.5,
and 2. The predictions of these three θps are shown in Figure
3 (Bottom); the temperature of all of the θps is set at 1. It can
be seen that, the difference in the entropy of predictions of
θp reduces when trained on predictions obtained with higher
softmax temperature in θup. This validates our hypothesis that
increasing the softmax temperature reduces the membership
leakage through predictions of θup.
The reason for this is as follows. Increasing the temperature
of softmax in θp smooths its predictions. This reduces the KL-
divergence loss in (8) back-propagated through the parameters
of θp, and therefore, also reduces the magnitude of gradients
used to update the parameters of θp in each epoch of its train-
ing. The small gradients prevent θp to learn any information,
including the membership information, from Y ref.
We note that, appropriately setting the temperature of soft-
max in θup significantly reduces the generalization error of
θp, along with reduction in membership inference risk. This
is demonstrated by Figure 4: Increasing the softmax T in θup
reduces the generalization error (i.e., the gap between the train
and test accuracies) of θp. However, high temperatures also
reduce general information about the distribution Pr(X,Y)
transferred to θp. This causes reduction in the classification
accuracy of θp, as we demonstrate in Table V.
Table I: Data sizes used in DMP training. Dtr and Dref are
training data and reference data, respectively. DA, D′A data
are adversary’s knowledge of members and non-members of
Dtr. Here, D′A and Dref are disjoint.
Dataset
DMP training Attack training
|Dtr| |Dref| |DA| |D′A|
Purchase-100 10000 10000 5000 5000
CIFAR-100 25000 25000 12500 8000
CIFAR-10 25000 25000 12500 8000
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Table II: Temperature of softmax layer for different combina-
tions of dataset and network architecture. These are used to
produce results of Table III.
Dataset Architecture Softmax T
Purchase-100 Fully Connected 1.0
CIFAR-100
AlexNet 4.0
DenseNet-BC (L=100, k=12) 4.0
DenseNet-BC (L=190, k=40) 1.0
CIFAR-10 AlexNet 1.0
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Datasets
Below, we detail the datasets and neural network architec-
tures used in our experiments.
CIFAR-100. CIFAR-100 is a popular benchmark dataset
used to evaluate image recognition algorithms [23]. It contains
60,000 color (RGB) images (50000 for training and 10000 for
testing), each of 32 × 32 pixels. The images are clustered into
100 classes based on objects in the images and each class has
500 training and 100 test images.
CIFAR-10. CIFAR-10 has 60,000 color (RGB) images
(50000 for training and 10000 for testing), each of 32 ×
32 pixels. The images are clustered into 10 classes based on
the objects in the images and each class has 5000 training
and 1000 test images. In DMP, protected models learn on
the knowledge of unprotected model; with large number of
classes, predictions of models tend to include more informa-
tion useful for training [40]. Therefore, We use this dataset
to assess the efficacy of DMP when the number of classes is
small.
Purchase-100. The Purchase100 dataset contains the shop-
ping records of several thousand online customers, extracted
during Kaggle’s “acquire valued shopper” challenge2. Each
record in the dataset is the shopping history of a single
customer. The dataset contains 600 different products, and
each user has a binary record which indicates whether she
has bought each of the products (a total of 197,324 data
records). The records are clustered into 100 classes based on
the similarity of the purchases, and our objective is to identify
the class of each user’s purchases.
B. Target model architectures
We use same architecture for both the unprotected and the
protected models unlike conventional distillation [16], . For
CIFAR-100 dataset, we use two state-of-the-art architectures:
AlexNet [24] and DenseNet [20]. AlexNet has 2.47M parame-
ters. We use two variants of DenseNet: DenseNet-BC (L=190,
k=40) with 25.62M parameters, denoted by Dense19, and
DenseNet-BC (L=100, k=12) with 0.77M parameters, denoted
by Dense12. We choose these two models to assess the efficacy
of DMP technique for models with varying capacities. For
2https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-challenge/data
CIFAR-10, we use AlexNet architecture. For Purchase100, we
used a fully connected network with hidden layers of sizes
{1024, 512, 256, 128}. We measure the training (Atrain) and
test (Atest) accuracy of these models as the percentage of the
training and test data for which the models produce correct
labels. The generalization error (Egenerr) is measured as the
difference of the training and the test accuracy.
C. Membership inference attack model architectures
We use the state-of-the-art membership inference attack
model proposed by Nasr et al. [31] to evaluate the strength
of DMP and compare it with the other defenses. For an input,
we use its feature vector, label and cross-entropy loss of
the target model’s prediction as the features in the blackbox
membership inference case. Along with these features, we also
use gradients of the loss with respect to last two layer of the
target model and outputs of the last two layers of the target
model as the features in the whitebox membership inference.
Following the previous works [40], [30], [31], we measure
the whitebox (Awb) and blackbox (Abb) membership inference
risks as the accuracy of corresponding attack model. Attack
model outputs member or non-member for a given record,
therefore the attack accuracy is measured as the percentage
of unknown test data for which the attack model correctly
predicts the membership (i.e., member is predicted member
and non-member is predicted non-member). We use the same
number of members and non-members in the unknown test
data.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
We present our evaluation of DMP, performed using the
experimental setup described in Section V.
A. Comparing DMP with prior membership inference defenses
In this section, we compare the performance of our DMP
technique with two state-of-the-art membership inference de-
fenses: Adversarial regularization [30] and DP-SGD [1]. We
use code of adversarial regularization provided by the authors
of [30] and use PyTorch implementation of DP-SGD verified
by the authors of TensorFlow DP-SGD library3.
Comparing to Adversarial Regularization. Table III com-
pares DMP with the adversarial regularization defense [30],
also showing the results for the corresponding unprotected
model. Egenerr are generalization errors, Atest are test accu-
racies of the target ML model and Awb, Abb are whitebox and
blackbox membership inference risks. The goal of an effective
defense mechanism is to reduce Egenerr, Awb and Abb while
keeping Atest high. As can be seen, the unprotected models
are highly susceptible to blackbox and whitebox membership
inference attacks for all the datasets and model architectures.
The adversarial regularization defense [30] reduces infer-
ence risk at the cost of large decreases in the model’s utility.
We use the adversarial regularization parameter, λ, proposed
by in the original work [30], i.e., 3 for Purchase-100 and 6
3https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy
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Table III: Comparison of generalization error, classification accuracy and membership inference risk of models trained with and
without membership inference defenses. Egenerr are generalization errors, Atest are test accuracies, and Awb, Abb are whitebox
and blackbox membership inference risks. DMP significantly improves tradeoff between membership privacy and classification
accuracy. Training accuracy is the summation of Egenerr and Atest.
Dataset Model
No Defense Adversarial regularization DMP
Egenerr Atest Awb Abb Egenerr Atest Awb Abb Egenerr Atest Awb Abb
Purchase-100 Fully Connected 25.0 74.9 82.3 82.0 22.4 68.1 62.3 61.9 12.6 74.3 55.5 55.4
CIFAR-100
AlexNet 63.2 36.8 90.3 91.3 50.9 31.6 79.3 78.3 6.5 35.7 55.7 55.6
Dense12 33.8 65.2 72.2 71.8 19.4 58.4 61.9 61.7 3.6 63.1 53.7 53.0
Dense19 34.4 65.5 82.3 81.6 30.8 53.7 69.5 68.7 7.3 65.3 54.7 54.4
CIFAR-10 AlexNet 32.5 67.5 77.9 77.5 29.8 62.6 65.2 65.0 3.1 65.0 51.3 50.6
for CIFAR datasets. For Purchase-100, classification accuracy
reduces by 5% to improve inference resistance by 20%.
However, DMP incurs just 0.6% accuracy reduction to improve
the resistance by 25%. For the simple Purchase-100 task, the
adversarially regularized model manages descent privacy and
utility tradeoff, but for more complex CIFAR-100, it reduces
inference risk just by 11-13% and classification accuracy by
5-7%. We observe that at higher λ values the defense incurs
very high loss in the accuracy and produces unusable models.
DMP, on the other hand, maintains the classification accuracy
within 2.5% of that of the baseline cases, while also reduces
the inference risk by 16% (CIFAR-10 + AlexNet) to 35%
(CIFAR-100 + AlexNet). This shows that, DMP reduces the
membership inference risk significantly with negligible
reduction in the classification accuracy and provides much
better tradeoff than adversarial regularization.
Adversarial regularization mitigates the membership infer-
ence risk to some extent, due to the adversarial training. The
authors of [30] claim that such training effectively regularizes
the final models (i.e., reduces their generalization error) over
the baseline models, and forces them to perform similarly
on members and non-members of the training data. But, the
regularization is not significant, especially for the smaller
training data sizes, because deep neural networks are harder to
prevent from over-fitting to smaller datasets, This can be seen
in Egenerr column of Table III: Here, the training data sizes are
smaller compared to the original work [30], and clearly show
the poor regularization performance of adversarial regulariza-
tion. Note that, this is precisely the reason why adversarially
regularized models are also prone to the membership inference
attacks we use to evaluate the defenses in this work. The large
generalization error due to poor regularization is sufficient to
mount membership inference attacks: Accuracy of both the
blackbox and whitebox membership inference is more than
60% in all the cases. Furthermore, we note that stronger infer-
ence attack models, used to strengthen the membership privacy
using adversarial regularization, fail to regularize the final
model while also compromising the classification accuracy.
On the other hand, the regularization performance of
DMP is far superior than that of adversarial regular-
ization: DMP reduces the generalization error by 10-folds
from 34% to 3.6% for CIFAR-100 with Dense12 and 63.2%
to 6.5% for AlexNet models, as shown in Table III. DMP’s
strong regularization performance is the result of distillation
using softmax layer at an appropriate temperature, as shown
in Section IV-C. This reduces the membership leakage and
prevents θp from learning fine-grained information about Dtr.
This can also be seen from the DMP training progress shown
in Figure 4, which implies that DMP-trained θp does not
overfit to the training data, due to the reduced membership
information leaked to θp. The reduction in the membership
leakage also reflects in the indistinguishability of various
statistics of the protected model, as we demonstrate in Section
VI-C. This indistinguishability of statistics is required to
mitigate the blackbox and whitebox inference attacks (Section
II-C). With increasing capacity, models tend to overfit more as
they can store fine-grained information about the training data
in their parameters. However, even with for the large capacity,
DMP-trained Dense19 incurs only 7.3% generalization error
and reduces the membership inference risk by 28%, as shown
in Table III.
Recall that the risk of membership inference increases for
the higher capacity models [31]. We assess the efficacy of
DMP on Dense12 and Dense19 architectures which have
significantly different capacities. With no defense, both models
have similar classification accuracy (∼ 65%) and generaliza-
tion error (∼ 35%). However, Dense19 is 9% more susceptible
to inference attacks than Dense12, due to the high capacity.
The larger capacity of Dense19 also incurs ∼ 5% higher
generalization error for the DMP-trained Dense19 compared to
the DMP-trained Dense12. But, the inference risk to Dense19
is only 1-2% higher than that of Dense12. Also, the low
whitebox inference attack accuracy implies that the extra
parameters of DMP-trained Dense19 do not contain any extra
membership information, and therefore, do not increase the
membership inference risk significantly.
In DMP, the empirical risk minimization formulated in (9) to
train θp forces it to imitate the behavior of θup on non-member
data. DMP incorporates the requirement of high accuracy of
classification on the test data from the final models in its
learning objective and reduces the test accuracy loss compared
to the other defenses. In DMP, θp learns from the prediction
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vectors, Y ref. Therefore, to understand the efficacy of DMP for
the task involving small number of classes, we experiment with
AlexNet architecture with CIFAR-10 data. As can be seen,
DMP results in high utility models even with small number
of classes, the classification performance reduces only by 2.5%
for CIFAR-10.
Comparing to DP-SGD. We compare DMP and DP-SGD
[1] defenses in terms of the (empirically observed) tradeoffs
between utility and privacy measured as membership inference
resistance. Recently, Jayaraman et al. [21] perform similar
analysis to find that the differentially private mechanisms offer
poor utility-privacy tradeoffs on complex tasks when evaluated
using membership and attribute inference attacks. Below, we
confirm these findings and show that DMP technique can
provide much better tradeoffs against strong membership infer-
ence attacks; we leave the evaluation using attribute inference
to future work.
DP-SGD provides theoretical differential privacy guaran-
tees by adding DP noise to gradients of loss on training
data used to update the model parameters during training.
Our motivation is to understand the privacy budget (, δ) of
DP-SGD required to achieve a reasonable tradeoff between
classification performance and the corresponding membership
inference risk. Table IV shows the results for AlexNet trained
on CIFAR-10 data, averaged over 3 runs of each experiment;
δ is constant at 10−6. We note that DP-SGD incurs significant
(35%) loss in classification performance at lower . With
larger , the accuracy of DP-SGD trained models improves
but at the cost of higher membership inference risk. This
risk arises due to poor generalization at high privacy budgets
which is sufficient for successful membership inference. More
importantly, for a specific empirical membership inference
risk (∼ 51%), models trained using DP-SGD incur much
higher classification performance loss (15.3%) than those
trained using DMP (2.5%), compared to the baseline
model.
Table IV: Tradeoff between utility and empirical membership
inference risk of DP-SGD-trained AlexNet for CIFAR-10.
At low , DP-SGD provides strong privacy but incurs large
accuracy loss, while at large , it achieves modest accuracy, but
incurs membership inference risk due to poor generalization.
For similar empirical membership inference resistance, the
accuracy of DMP-trained models is 12.8% higher than DP-
SGD-trained models.
Defense
Privacy Training Test Attack
Budget () Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
No defense n/a 100 67.5 77.9
DMP n/a 68.1 65.0 51.3
DP-SGD
>100 55.8 52.2 51.7
50.2 37.2 36.9 50.2
12.5 30.2 31.7 49.9
6.8 27.8 29.4 50.0
Table V: Classification accuracy and membership inference
risk for different softmax temperatures. Increase in tempera-
ture of softmax layer of θup reduces its sensitivity to input
perturbations. This indeed reduces sensitive information, Iml,
transferred to θp which results in lower generalization error
and lower inference risk as shown.
Defense
Softmax Training Test Attack
T Accuracy Accuracy Accuracy
No defense n/a 100 36.8 91.3
DMP
2 46.6 37.3 57.4
4 42.2 35.7 55.6
6 36.4 32.8 52.5
8 12.1 12.3 51.7
B. Choice of parameters in DMP
We demonstrate the impact of various parameters of DMP
on its performance.
1) The size of reference data: DMP-trained models learn
from the knowledge in the predictions of θup on the non-
sensitive reference data. The membership leakage, Iml, through
the predictions of θup on Xref increases with the size of
Xref as argued in Section IV-A. To validate this hypothesis,
we quantify the classification accuracy and the membership
inference risk of θp with increasing the amount of Xref used
for distillation. We use Purchase-100 data and vary |Xref|
as shown in Figure 5; in all the experiments, we fix the
softmax T of θup at 1.0. For our unprotected model θup, it
has a train accuracy, test accuracy, and membership inference
risk of 100%, 74.9% and 82.3%, respectively. Initially, the
test accuracy of θp increases with |Xref| due to the useful
knowledge transferred. But, beyond the test accuracy of θup,
its predictions essentially inserts noise in the training data of
θp, therefore the gain from increasing the size of reference data
slows down. Although this noise marginalizes the increase in
the test performance of θp, it also prevents θp from learning
more about Dtr and prevents further inference risk; this is
shown by the train accuracy and membership inference risk
curves in Figure 5, respectively. Therefore, size of reference
data should be selected based on the desired tradeoff between
utility and privacy of the final model.
Finally, we note that if the reference data used in DMP
is labeled, i.e., if the correct Yref are available for Xref, the
performance of DMP both in terms of classification accuracy
and membership risk due to θp will improve. For CIFAR-
100 with Dense12 model, DMP-trained θp with unlabeled Xref
has classification accuracy and membership risk of 63.1% and
53.7%, respectively. For the same dataset and model, with
labeled Xref, the classification accuracy and membership risk
are 67.2% and 51.8%, respectively. Similarly, for Purchase-
100, the classification accuracy increases from 74.3% to 77.2%
and the membership risk reduces from 55.5% to 51.4%; the
generalization error reduces by half from 12.6% to 6.8%.
Therefore, similar to data augmentation, DMP also serves as
a utility improvement technique in the presence of labeled
10
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Epochs
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Train accuracy
Test accuracy
CIFAR-100, DenseNet with DFP (T=2)
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Epochs
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Train accuracy
Test accuracy
CIFAR-100, DenseNet with DFP (T=4)
0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200
Epochs
10
20
30
40
50
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Train accuracy
Test accuracy
CIFAR-100, DenseNet with DFP (T=6)
Figure 4: Impact of softmax temperature on training of θp. The higher temperatures reduce the sensitive information content in
the predictions of θup on Xref that the inference attacks (Section II-C) exploit. Therefore, with higher temperatures membership
inference risk and generalization of θp improves, but at the cost of reduction in the classification accuracy.
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Figure 5: Classification accuracy and membership inference
risk for different |Xref|. The membership leakage Iml increases
with increase in the number of queries made to θup, which
increases the classification performance, although, at the cost
of membership inference risk.
reference data. In presence of labeled reference data, DMP
outperforms the unprotected models in terms of classi-
fication accuracy while also preserving the membership
privacy of the sensitive training data.
2) The temperature of the softmax layer: The softmax
temperature, T , in θup plays an important role in the amount of
knowledge transferred from the private to non-private model
(Section IV-C). Using a softmax layer with high temperature
reduces the membership leakage about Dtr via predictions of
θup and improves resistance to membership inference attacks
of θp. The softmax layer also reduces the sensitivity of θup to
perturbations in its inputs and provides stability to θup, which
in turn strengthens the generalization error of θp. Our results
in Table V confirm our analytical understanding of the use
of softmax layer: increasing the temperature for AlexNet with
CIFAR-100 dataset reduces the classification accuracy of θp,
but also that of membership inference attacks. Therefore, the
softmax temperature T should be chosen depending on the de-
sired privacy-utility tradeoff. Table II shows the temperatures
used in our experiments for different datasets and models.
C. Reasoning about the effectiveness of DMP
In this section, we present the statistics of different features
of the target models, trained with and without defenses, on the
members and non-members of their training data. As discussed
in Section II-C, the blackbox and whitebox membership in-
ference attacks [31], [40], [28], [15] exploit these statistical
differences.
Figure 4 shows the effect of softmax T on the training
accuracy on the private training data, Dtr, and test accuracy
of θp as the training progresses. In theory, with increase
in T of softmax layer of θup, the generalization error of
θp should decrease due to reduced membership leakage. We
observe this in Figure 4: From left to right, the general-
ization errors of θp trained with temperatures 2, 4, 6 are
4.7% (66.3, 61.6), 3.6% (66.7, 63.1), and 0.8% (55.7, 54.9),
respectively. Parentheses show the corresponding training and
test accuracies, respectively. This confirms that increasing
softmax T improves DMP’s reduces membership leakage
and strengthens membership resistance (Section IV-C).
In Figure 6, we show the fraction of classes (y-axis) for
which the generalization error of the target models is lesser
than a particular value (x-axis). Here, closer the line to the
line x = 0, lower the generalization error. We observe that,
with the no defense case as baseline, the reduction in the
generalization error using DMP is more than twice that
using the adversarial regularization. DMP reduces the
error by half for Purchase-100 and the reduction is 10-folds
for CIFAR-100 dataset. Along with the generalization error,
reducing the difference in entropies of predictions of target
models on members and non-members of the training data is
a necessary condition to mitigate the membership inference
attacks. In Figures 2 and 3, we show how increasing the
softmax T and using non-members in the distillation phase
reduces the difference in the entropies. Note that adversarial
regularization performs well for large training datasets, but we
explicitly consider small training datasets as they are harder
to prevent from overfitting and therefore from the membership
inference.
To assess the efficacy of DMP against the stronger white-
box membership inference attacks [31], [28], we study the
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Figure 6: The empirical CDF of the generalization error
of models trained with DMP and adversarial regularization
(AdvReg), and without defense. The y-axis is the fraction
of classes that have generalization error less than the corre-
sponding value on x-axis. The error reduction using DMP is
much larger (10-folds for CIFAR-100 dataset and by 2-folds
for Purchase-100 dataset) than using AdvReg. Refer to Table
III for the specific accuracies.
gradients of input loss of θup versus θp on members and non-
members of Dtr. Figure 7 shows the fraction of members and
non-members given on y-axes that fall in a particular range of
gradient norm values given on x-axes. Gradients are computed
with respect to the parameters of the given model. We note that
the distribution of the norms of θup (upper figures) is heavily
skewed to the left for the members, i.e., towards lower gradient
norm values, unlike that for the non-members. This is because
θup memorizes Dtr and therefore the loss and its gradient for
the members is very small compared to the non-members.
Therefore, non-members are more evenly distributed over a
large range of the norm values. However, for the DMP-trained
θp, both members and non-members are evenly distributed
across a large range of gradient norm values. This implies
loss of DMP-trained θp on members singnificantly increases.
This implies that DMP significantly reduces the unintended
memorization of Dtr in the model parameters and makes
gradients of members and non-members indistinguishable.
This is reflected in the significant reduction (27.6%) in the
membership inference risk to the large capacity Dense19
model (Table III). This indistinguishability of different statis-
tics of features of θp on members and non-members mitigates
the membership inference risk to Dtr with either of blackbox
and whitebox access to θp.
VII. RELATED WORK
Privacy preserving machine learning is an active area of
research. Defenses based on trusted hardware and crypto-
graphic primitives [4], [17], [26], [29] hinder a direct access
to sensitive training data during training. However, the final
models remain susceptible to various inference attacks through
blackbox or whitebox accesses, especially for large capac-
ity neural networks due to their large memorization capaci-
ties [12]. Such inference attacks include input inference [13],
blackbox and whitebox membership inference [40], [31], [38],
attribute inference [6], parameter inference [43], [44], training
data embedding attacks [41], and side-channel attacks [46]. In
this paper, we focus on the membership inference attacks for
adversaries with blackbox and whitebox access to the model.
Several recent defenses have been proposed against mem-
bership inference attacks [1], [35], [30], [33]. Unfortunately,
such existing defenses do not provide practically acceptable
tradeoffs between privacy and utility, i.e., they hurt the model’s
prediction accuracy significantly to provide membership pri-
vacy. Defenses based on differential privacy (DP) [1], [35],
[33], [22], [36] provide rigorous membership privacy guaran-
tees, but at prohibitive costs to the accuracy of the models. For
instance, the DP-SGD defense proposed by Abadi et al. [1]
incurs significant classification losses and high generalization
errors for complex classification tasks, e.g., the accuracy loss
and generalization error for training on CIFAR-10 are both
∼7% in their original work. Such a high generalization error
is sufficient for membership inference [27], [37], [40], [31],
therefore, the membership privacy of such models can be
breached. Adversarial regularization [30] is another recent
defense that is tailored to membership inference attacks, in
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Figure 7: Distribution of gradient norms of members and non-members for CIFAR-100 and Purchase-100 datasets. (Upper row):
The distribution of gradient norms of the unprotected model, θup, for members and non-members of its training data. Without
privacy enforcement, member norms are skewed towards 0 due to memorization by networks, unlike the non-member norms.
(Lower row): The distribution of gradient norms of the protected model, θp, for members and non-members of the private
training data. DMP significantly increases the members’ gradient norms making them indistinguishable from the non-members’
norms.
contrast to DP techniques that are general defenses. As shown
in Section VI, the adversarial regularization defense suffers
from large accuracy losses for smaller training datasets, and
does not converge when stronger inference attack models are
used during the adversarial training.
Knowledge distillation has been used in several privacy
defenses [33], [22], [36], [32], which perform distillation
using the noisy aggregate of predictions of models of multiple
data holders. In particular, PATE [33] combines knowledge
distillation and DP [1]. In PATE, an input is labeled by an
ensemble of teacher models, and the final student model is
trained using the noisy aggregates of all labels; finally, the DP
noise is added during the aggregation. These approaches add
large amounts of noise to provide privacy to any data with the
underlying distribution, and in this process incur high accuracy
losses [35]. However, due to the targeted motivation to provide
membership inference resistance, our technique relies on the
noise due to the low confidence of models in the predictions
on test data and on the indistinguishavility due to reduced sen-
sitivity of predictions due to a softmax layer at an appropriate
temperature. PATE requires a large number of teacher models
to compensate for the noise added to the individual query
responses. Therefore, it requires huge amounts of training
data (65M for Glyph character recognition task), availability
of which may not be practical for an individual user using
some MLaaS platform. Finally, similar to DP-SGD [1], PATE
does not evaluate the empirical membership inference risk
of its models. Bassily et al. [3] propose similar approach
as PATE. The work focuses on providing differential privacy
using the sparse vector technique [11] and gives bounds on
sample complexity in terms of the VC dimensions of the task.
Wang et al. [45] propose RONA, a private model compression
technique that adds noise similar to DP-SGD [1] during the
training of a student model. Our approach differs from these
in that, we do not explicitly add DP noise, and instead, use the
inherent noise in knowledge transfer to achieve membership
inference resistance (i.e., privacy) for free. Our evaluation is
similar to that in [21].
Long et al. [27] investigated membership inference attacks
against well-generalized models. Their attack identifies the
vulnerable outliers in the sensitive training data of the well-
generalized models to infer their membership. In DMP, the
outliers can be protected by setting high softmax temperatures,
but at the cost of utility degradation. This is similar to previous
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defenses: in DP-SGD, privacy budget is reduced and in the
adversarial regularization, high regularization factor is set to
provide privacy to the outliers. But the important difference
is that, in DMP, the expected membership privacy protection
to the given sensitive training data is very strong and incurs
significantly lower classification accuracy costs compared to
previous defenses.
To summarize, all of the existing defenses rely on adding
some explicit noise during the training or regularization of
the model in different ways. Because of such explicit noise
additions, all these defenses suffer from significant utility
degradations in terms of classification performance of the final
models. By contrast, DMP provides membership inference
resistance using various implicit sources of noise due to
knowledge distillation. Knowledge distillation presents itself
as a promising option for practical utility-privacy trade-offs
because of its proven ability to transfer the utility of the
cumbersome model to the final model [16].
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by the poor tradeoffs between model utility and
resistance to membership inference attacks, we introduced dis-
tillation for membership privacy (DMP), an effective defense
against membership inference attacks on machine learning
models. DMP leverages various sources of noise in the knowl-
edge distillation (transfer) process to train models resilient
to membership inference and with high classification perfor-
mance. DMP trains machine learning models that are resistant
to whitebox and blackbox membership inference attacks while
preserving the utility (e.g., classification accuracy) of the
models significantly better than state-of-the-art membership
inference defenses. We validate DMP’s superior performance
in terms of tradeoff between membership privacy and utility
of the models, and in terms of regularization strength through
extensive experiments on different deep neural networks and
using various benchmark datasets.
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